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Enough Said: A Proposal for
Shortening Supreme Court Opinions
Meg Penrose
"Brevity is the soul of wit." - William Shakespeare'
Are the United States Supreme Court Justices effective legal
writers? Economical with language? Clear? Mindful of reader
needs? Few have addressed this subject directly.2 Most scholar-
ship focuses on case results, ideology, and perceived analytical
lapses without considering whether the Court's opinions are well
written. Yet the question merits attention - serious attention -
with an emphasis on efficacy rather than on ideology or outcome.
The Justices have written about effective writing.' They have
made their case about the need for accuracy, brevity, and clarity
from litigants.' The Court's own rules demand nothing less. 5 But
do the Justices heed their own advice? Nearly all the current Jus-
tices have complained about the length and verbosity of Supreme
1 Hamlet, Act 2, scene 2, 86-92.
2 But see Norman E. Plate, Do As I Say, Not As I Do: A Report Card on Plain
Language in the United States Supreme Court, 13 T.M. Cooley J. Prac. &
Clinical L. 80 (2010) (providing one of the few qualitative assessments grading
the Justices' writing); see also Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 40-41
(2013) (who, based on his student-teaching experience at Harvard, would give
the current Justices "higher grades in a freshman composition course" than the
Justices of the 1960s).
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of
Persuading Judges (2008).
4 Id. at 23-24; see also Interviews with United States Supreme Court Justices, 13
Scribes J. Legal Writing 1, 22, 50, 51-54, 82-83, 96, 102, 119-21, 127, 133-34,
137, 165, 166-67, 170-71, 173-74 (2010).
5 U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 14.
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Court briefs.' And yet the average Supreme Court opinion, in-
cluding concurrences and dissents, is longer than the Constitu-
tion.
This should change. The Justices should lead by example.
Run-on opinions tax readers, can leave the law unclear or unset-
tled, and strain the Court's credibility given its strict word limits
for litigants. Lengthy opinions also send a bad message to new
generations of lawyers. After all, law students' primary method
of learning constitutional law begins with reading Supreme Court
opinions, often prolix,7 to discern "what the law is."' By writing
lengthy opinions, Justices perpetuate the same legal-writing hab-
its that they bemoan. And this persists despite the numerous calls,
spanning over a century, for shorter, clearer opinions.
By this article's end, I hope to have convinced you - and the
Court - that Justices should adhere to existing Supreme Court
rules that limit the length of litigants' filings. Whether by internal
rule or informal agreement, the Justices should avoid drafting
opinions that rival novels in length. Change is needed. Now.
Supreme Length: Opinions Rivaling Novels
For decades, Americans - including Supreme Court Justices
- have decried the verbose complexity of judicial opinions.' The
6 See Justice Interviews, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 35, 50, 53, 102, 119-20, 137,
167, 174.
7 Bryan A. Garner, The Elements of Legal Style 2 (2d ed. 2002) (We lawyers "have
a history of wretched writing, a history that reinforces itself every time we open
the lawbooks.").
8 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and
the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is."); see Interview with
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 5, 10-11 (2010).
9 See Robert Kingsley, The Length of fudicial Opinions, 17 Mass. L.Q. 28 (1931).
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substance of the criticism has not changed."0 It has remained con-
sistent and untempered. It continues today.
As early as 1939, the President of the American Bar Associa-
tion lamented:
The increased complexity of modern society does not call
for increased cumbersomeness in judicial opinions ....
[S]ince the invention of stenography and of dictating ma-
chines, and since employment of high-speed typists and in-
dustrious legal secretaries, these opinions are steadily and
rapidly getting longer and longer .... If the judges would
use fewer words, they would not only reduce our law book
bill: they would also make it easier for us to find out what
their opinions mean.11
This was nearly 80 years ago, before the computer, the Internet,
the cert pool, and the increasing numbers of judicial law clerks.
One can only imagine President Beardsley's reaction to opinions
that are now longer than many of Shakespeare's plays and numer-
ous classic American novels.
Much more recently, legal-writing expert Bryan Garner made
a similar appeal for concise, clear judicial opinions: "The field of
law would benefit if we had shorter judicial opinions - as op-
posed to opinions bloated with hand-wringing dicta that only ob-
scure the law."12
Despite its own calls for shorter briefs, including mandating
change through the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
1o See, e.g., AbnerJ. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 Colo. L. Rev. 647, 647 (1985)
("Judicial opinions (at which Professor Rodell took a very heft sideswipe) have
not changed except to become even longer and more numerous.").
" Charles A. Beardsley, Judicial Draftsmanship, 26 A.B.A. J. 3, 3 (1940) (and
adding, "[T]he judges don't stop when they run out of their own words. They
cause their typists to copy paragraph after paragraph, and sometimes page after
page, of other judges' words - all of which copies words the lawyers have
already bought and paid for stored on their book shelves.").
12 Bryan A. Garner, How Lockhart Really Should Have Been Decided: Canons of
Construction Are Key, 102 Judicature 56, 57 (2018).
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Roberts Court has issued 5 of the 11 lengthiest opinions in Su-
preme Court history." This is remarkable in light of the Justices'
stated preferences for brevity and clarity.14 Chief Justice Roberts
once observed: "I have yet to put down a brief and say, 'I wish
that had been longer.' . . . Almost every brief I've read could be
shorter."15 Former Justice John Paul Stevens agreed, noting that
briefs "seem somewhat longer than necessary on occasion."16 Jus-
tice Scalia called "prolixity" the main shortcoming of most
briefs." Justice Thomas urged litigants to make their briefs "as
short as necessary" - to "pare them down to what you need, not
expand them to the page limit."" Justice Breyer likewise lamented
13 Ten of the Longest Supreme Court Decisions, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2010/11/18/us/1 8rulingsGrfxB.html?action=
click&contentCollection=U.S.&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArt
icle&pgtype=article. The N.Y. Times chart provides the following list:
Buckley v. Valeo 76,639 words
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 70,228 words
Furman v. Georgia 66,233 words
McDonald v. Chicago (Roberts Court) 58,597 words
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Board 58,404 words
Oregon v. Mitchell 51,628 words
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Roberts Court) 50,096 words
Planned Parenthood v. Casey 48,878 words
Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission (Roberts Court) 48,686 words
Parents Involved v. Seattle (Roberts Court) 47,235 words
This 2010 chart omits the 2012 decision in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), the so-called Obamacare case, which is
52,395 words.
14 See Justice Interviews, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 35, 50, 53, 102, 119-20, 137,
167, 174.
15 Chief Justice Roberts Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 35.
16 Interview with Justice John Paul Stevens, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 41, 50
(2010).
17 Interview with Justice Antonin Scalia, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 51, 53 (2010).
" Interview with Justice Clarence Thomas, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 99, 120
(2010).
that briefs are too long." He admitted that when he "see[s] some-
thing 50 pages,... I'm already going to groan. And I'm going to
wonder, Did he really have to write that 50 pages? I would have
preferred 30."2 With this uniform preference for brevity, it is
troubling that many Supreme Court opinions fail to lead by ex-
ample.
Brown v. Board of Education,21 the seminal constitutional
case striking down "separate but equal" education, was fewer
than 4,000 words.2 2 Yet when the Roberts Court addressed mod-
ern integration efforts, a far less momentous undertaking, the de-
cision reached 47,235 words - or 12 times Brown's length.2 3
For years, the Supreme Court - and the Roberts Court in
particular - has been issuing increasingly verbose opinions. In
2010, the average opinion length, including concurrences and dis-
sents, reached a new record: nearly 5,000 words per opinion.24 To
help put this number in perspective, the Gettysburg Address was
roughly 270 words.25 The Declaration of Independence is 1,458
words, including signatures.26 The average length of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's dozen State of the Union addresses was only
3,563 words.2 7 The U.S. Constitution itself is just over 4,500
1 See Interview with Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 145,
167 (2010).
20 Id.
21 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22 Id.; Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html.
23 Liptak, supra note 22.
24 Id.
25 The Brevity of Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address Continues to Inspire on
150th Anniversary, N.Y. Daily News, Nov. 19, 2013.
26 Sol Bloom, Constitution of the United States: Questions and Answers, Charters
Freedom, https://www.archives.gov/f ounding-docs/constitution-q-and-a (last
visited Nov. 11, 2016).
27 The American Presidency Project, Length of State of the Union Messages and
Addresses in Words, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou-words.php (last visited
January 29, 2017).
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words, including signatures.28 Thus, the average Supreme Court
opinion, which often answers a single discrete constitutional
question, is now longer than the very document it is interpreting.
Something is askew.
Several recent Roberts Court opinions underscore the incon-
gruity between the Justices' advice for concision and their actual
practice. Trump v. Hawaii (the "travel ban" case),29 one of 2018's
most anticipated decisions, was over 25,000 words. Five Justices
wrote individual opinions, ranging from Justice Kennedy's 358-
word concurrence to Justice Roberts's 11,206-word majority
opinion. Similarly, Sessions v. Dimaya,30 another 2018 immigra-
tion case, nearly eclipsed 30,000 words because four Justices
wrote lengthy individual opinions. Justice Thomas's 10,000-word
dissenting opinion was 2,000 words longer than Justice Kagan's
majority opinion.
The 2017 term was no aberration.
Obergefell v. Hodges," the controversial 2015 same-sex-
marriage case, generated five separate opinions totaling nearly
24,000 words. Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion was
actually one page longer than the majority opinion.32 To help give
perspective, after combining the various Justices' separate opin-
ions, Obergefell and Trump are each longer than 19 of Shake-
speare's plays" and nearly as long as Ernest Hemingway's The
28 Id.
29 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
31 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
31 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
32 See id. at 2611-26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Shakespeare's Plays, Listed by Number of Words, Open Source Shakespeare,
http://www.opensourceshakespeare.org/views/plays/plays-numwords.php
(last visited Oct. 10, 2016). The Obergefell opinion is nearly as long as Romeo
and Juliet (24,545 words) and longer than the following works: Richard II
(22,423); Merry Wives of Windsor (21,845 words); Measure for Measure (21,780
words); As You Like It (21,690 words); Henry VI, Part 1 (21,607 words); Love's
Labour's Lost (21,459 words); Merchant of Venice (21,291 words); Much Ado
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Old Man and the Sea (roughly 26,000 words).34 And they're
longer than every single U.S. president's average State of the Un-
ion address - by wide and consistent margins.
In 2010, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,"
the First Amendment case permitting extensive campaign spend-
ing by noncandidates, totaled 48,686 words - 2,000 words longer
than Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451 (46,118 words) and nearly
20,000 words longer than George Orwell's Animal Farm (29,966
words), Charles Dickens's A Christmas Carol (28,944 words),
John Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men (29,160 words), and Shake-
speare's longest play, Hamlet (approximately 30,500 words). 6
The Court's 2008 decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago,"
holding that the Second Amendment is incorporated against the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, amassed 58,597
words. This is remarkable because McDonald was merely an in-
corporation case. The more notable Second Amendment case,
District of Columbia v. Heller," broke more new ground than
McDonald and yet is shorter. McDonald rivals the length of Lord
of the Flies (62,481 words) and Brave New World (64,531
words)."
About Nothing (21,157 words); Taming of the Shrew (21,055 words); King John
(20,772 words); Titus Andronicus (20,743 words); Twelfth Night (19,837 words);
Julius Caesar (19,703 words); Pericles (18,529 words); Timon of Athens (18,216
words); Two Gentlemen of Verona (17,129 words); Macbeth (17,121 words);
Midsummer Night's Dream (16,511 words); and Comedy of Errors (14,701
words).
34 Average Book Lengths: Guess How Many Words Are In A Novel, www
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/09. See also commonplacebook.com/art/books
/word-count-for-famous-novels (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
35 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
36 Open Source Shakespeare, supra note 33; see also Average Book Lengths, supra
note 34.
37 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
554 U.S. 570 (2008) (confirming Second Amendment right to defend oneself in
the home with a handgun).
' Average Book Lengths, supra note 34.
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Finally, the Court's 2012 decision in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,40 which decided the Affordable
Health Care Act's fate (in part), came in at a robust 52,395 words.
This decision surpasses F. Scott Fitzgerald's classic The Great
Gatsby, which is just over 47,000 words.4 1 The excessive length
was split evenly between the majority, concurring, and main dis-
senting opinions.42 All three rival the length of Shakespearean
plays. Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion, at 17,020 words,
excluding footnotes, is essentially as long as Macbeth. 43 Justice
Ginsburg's concurring opinion, at 16,436 words, came close to
achieving the length of A Midsummer Night's Dream.44 Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion, the longest of any of the opinions,
came in at 18,726 words, 4 5 or just under the length of Julius Caesar
and Twelfth Night.46 In short, this one Supreme Court case, in its
unedited format, demands the same reading attention required for
three Shakespearean plays.
With this trend, the Court is exacerbating a long-standing
problem. As its opinions expand in length and complexity, public
access suffers despite society's increased interest in, and ready
physical access to, the Court's opinions. True accessibility - in-
cluding actual understanding - is hampered by unnecessarily
long opinions.
The Court's trend toward lengthy opinions is also at odds
with its long-standing calls for brevity from litigants. As early as
1923, Justice Clark encouraged litigants who sought favor with
the Court to "condense, condense, condense and then con-
40 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
41 www.readinglength.com/book/isbnO743273567 (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
42 See Nat'l Fed'n, 567 U.S. 519.
43 Open Source Shakespeare, supra note 33 (listing The Tempest at 16,633 words).
44 Id. (listing A Midsummer Night's Dream at 16,511 words).
45 Id. If Justice Scalia's dissent were a Shakespearean play, it would be the sixth
shortest.
46 Id. (listingjulius Caesar at 19,703 words and Twelfth Night at 19,837 words).
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dense."4 7 The Justices have been consistent in advising litigants to
keep their words lean and their ideas clear. They have urged law-
yers to omit unnecessary details,48 avoid repeating themselves,49
and be careful about the language they use." Justice Scalia gave a
convincing summary of the problem: "I don't want to hear the
same thing again. You're wasting my time. When you waste my
time, I begin turning the pages faster and I may miss something
that you would have wanted me to see. If there are fewer pages, I
will pay attention."51
Given the Justices' impatience with runaway briefs, one won-
ders why the Court isn't making the necessary effort to shorten
its opinions and make them more manageable for the average per-
son. The current Justices are deciding far fewer cases than in past
decades.52 Yet even with fewer decisions and more time to edit,
the Court's opinions are longer and more fragmented.5 1 Increas-
ingly, each Justice wants to have his or her own say, often writing
lengthy concurring or dissenting opinions.
The Justices are well aware of the problems associated with
prolix writing - and with lengthy opinions. And they
acknowledge that opinions can, and should, be both shorter and
more accessible. Justice Alito, for example, confirms that "in gen-
eral [judicial opinions] could be shortened . . . . [Ilt's mostly a
47 Clarke, 9 A.B.A. J. at 80.
justice Ginsburg Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 133-34 (reminding law
students that "good, concise writing counts").
9 Justice Scalia Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 72.
o Interview with Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 79, 97
(2010) ("[T]he law lives through language, and we must be very careful about
the language we use.").
51 Justice Scalia Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 54.
52 Posner, Reflections on Judging at 43-44 (noting a drop from over 180 opinions
per term in the 1930s to about 150 per term in the 1960s-to the Roberts Court's
output of 50-65% fewer opinions than past courts).
Id. at 44 (observing that "no one thinks that the length of Supreme Court opin-
ions is positively correlated with their quality").
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matter of time and energy. It is the process of shortening - it's
work, it's time-consuming, and it requires mental energy to do
it." 5 4 Justice Ginsburg hopes her writing is "clear enough for a lay
audience." 5 5 She tries to keep her opinions to fewer than 20
pages. 6 When she fails, she "regret[s] that [she] couldn't make it
shorter."5 7 Justice Scalia reminded us that there are real costs to
lengthy opinions.5 As he explained, judicial opinions must "be
short - as short as the nature of the case allows - because the
time [to read and get through them] gets billed to somebody."5
Indeed, when a lawyer must read - carefully - the equivalent of
a novella, the client's fees mount quickly.
As for accessibility, Justice Thomas has long stressed the need
for ordinary people to understand his opinions, whether "a par-
ent" or "the person at the gas station."o6 He's observed that
"[t]here are some average readers and barely above average [read-
ers] out here. There are people who are busy - busy sole practi-
tioners out here, busy judges who are doing all sorts of things,
part-time judges. We've got to write for them. Shouldn't they
have access to the Constitution?"6 1
So why not strive for more brevity? If, as Justice Scalia noted,
"[t]o write well is to communicate well. To write poorly is to
communicate poorly," 6 2 why don't the Justices do more to im-
prove their writing through concision? Many, even some of the
Justices, blame judicial law clerks - who often play a role in
5 Interview with Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 169, 175
(2010).
" Interview with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 133,
141 (2010).
56 Id. at 134.
Id.
5 Justice Scalia Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 54.
Id.
60 Justice Thomas Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 100, 129.
61 Id.
62 Justice Scalia Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 51.
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drafting opinions - for the increasing length and complexity of
court opinions.6 ' But it is the Justices who sign their names to
opinions. It is the Justices who have been vetted and confirmed
by the Senate. It is the Justices, not their clerks, who are charged
with the duty to "say what the law is" with sufficient clarity. To
place the writing responsibility on anyone besides the Justices is
to give the Justices a pass that they do not give litigants.
The Justices know what it means to write crisp, clear sen-
tences and present well-structured legal arguments. Few would
dispute that they are among the best legal minds in our country
and are gifted writers in many respects. Some modern Justices ex-
cel at direct, conversational writing.64 The true genius, Justice
Thomas contends, "is having a ten-dollar idea in a five-cent sen-
tence, not having a five-cent idea in a ten-dollar sentence."6 5 So if
the Justices know what constitutes concise, effective legal writing,
why would they sign off on something longer and more confus-
ing than necessary? If the Justices detest 50-page briefs, why
would they draft opinions that exceed 50 pages and continue to
grow?
A Supreme Court opinion should not require more time and
attention than a Shakespearean play. With many of the Court's
opinions weighing in between Shakespeare's shortest play, The
Comedy of Errors (14,701 words), and his longest play, Hamlet
(30,066 words), legal audiences are being asked to give increasing
attention to the Court's prose. 66 The Justices are not writing
63 Justice Alito Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 175-76; Justice Stevens
Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 42; see also Posner, Reflections onJudg-
ing at 45-46; William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It
Is 299 (1987).
64 See Jill Barton, Supreme Court Splits ... on Grammar and Writing Style, 17
Scribes J. Legal Writing 33 passim (2016-2017).
65 Justice Thomas Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 100.
66 Open Source Shakespeare, supra note 33; cf Garner, The Elements of Legal Style
at 12 (reminding that "[l]egal writing shouldn't be lethal reading").
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opinions "to show [that they are] well-read. [They're] writing an
opinion as a useful document to lawyers and judges."1 7 As a Fifth
Circuit judge put it more than 50 years ago, "Here is the place for
the perfectionist. He is the polisher who goes the last mile to
[e]nsure the accomplishment of his goal: brevity, clarity and prec-
edential preciseness."6
It is time to turn the mirror back on the Justices.
Supremely Simple: The ABCs
As noted above, good legal writing generally requires three
elements: accuracy, brevity, and clarity.69 It is serious writing70
and should avoid attempts at wittiness and personal invectives.7
It "is not the place for the artist or poet." 72 The law must be stated
67 Justice Breyer Interview, 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing at 155.
6" Griffin B. Bell, Style in Judicial Writing, 15 J. Pub. L. 214, 217 (1966).
69 Garner, The Elements of Legal Style at 4-5 ("The chief aim of style is clarity.
But achieving clarity is only the first step; much remains - brevity, for example,
and accuracy."); see also Joseph Kimble, The Straight Skinny on Better Judicial
Opinions, 9 Scribes J. Legal Writing 1, 22 (2003-2004) ("Above all, revere clarity
and simplicity. . . .").
70 Griffin B. Bell, Style in Judicial Writing, 1 J. Nat'l Ass'n Admin. L. Judges 26,
29 (Fall 1981) (reminding that "[t]he adversary process is serious: life, liberty or
property is at stake").
71 See Marshall F. McComb, A Mandate from the Bar: Shorter and More Lucid
Opinions, 35 A.B.A. J. 382, 384 (1949) ("Do not scold the trial judge, counsel,
parties or your colleagues. It is your duty to decide the controverted questions
presented, not to present your views on the numerous problems confronting
humanity. Such unnecessary comments are discourteous and a waste of time.
Usually they indicate an unfortunate feeling of self-righteousness on the part of
the author. Remember there is never a good reason for being discourteous, even
in a written opinion."); see also Frances A. Leach, The Length of Judicial
Opinions, 21 Yale L.J. 141, 145 (1911) ("[I]t is a serious question whether...
humor or possibly facetiousness is properly the part of the expression by a court
of final resort of its conclusions of law.").
72 Douglas E. Abrams, What Great Writers Can Teach Lawyers and judges: Pre-
cise, Concise, Simple and Clear, N.H. B.J. 6, 6 (Summer 2011) (citing Oliver
accurately without hyperbole. The law must be stated in as few
words as necessary to accurately convey the message. "Ideally,
legal writing is taut."7 It's that simple.
Needless length impairs clarity. Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that "[i]f a sentence takes up more than six lines of type on
an ordinary page, it is probably too long." 74 But length alone is
not the problem. Increasingly, there are complaints that the
Court's decisions lack clarity. When a person reaches the end of
a lengthy opinion and cannot discern what the Court held - as
in Obergefell - the lack of clarity becomes as maddening as the
unnecessary length. 5 First and foremost, an opinion must be
clear. If the law is not clear, if it is not understood, the entire point
of legal writing has failed. 6
When I presented this research at law schools, some scholars
challenged that the metrics used to assess the Justices' writing
must consider - and vary with - their audience. I find this ar-
gument unconvincing. First, the Supreme Court has multiple au-
diences at any given time, ranging from the litigants to the lower
courts to every judge in the nation - not to mention our police,
legislators, family members, and neighbors." Like Judge Aldisert,
I believe that if the Court focuses on its primary audience, then
Wendell Holmes, "The Profession of the Law," in Collected Legal Papers 29, 29
(1920)).
7' Garner, The Elements of Legal Style at 53.
7' Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is at 299.
71 See Vicki Waye, Who Are judges Writing for?, 34 U.W. Austl. L. Rev. 274, 286
(2009) (describing Australian courts in a manner that seems apt of many courts:
"It seems the more important and controversial a case, the longer the exegesis
required to justify its outcome.").
76 See Albert Chandler, Appellate Opinions: A Lawyer and a Reporter Offer Sug-
gestions, 35 A.B.A. J. 277, 279 (1949) (observing that "[t]he man in the street,
being presumed to know the law, has a right to see it clearly, and ought to be
made to see it").
7 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Case Against the Supreme Court 314-15 (2014) (listing
six general audiences: (1) the parties; (2) the press and public; (3) scholars and
teachers; (4) the lower courts; (5) government officials; and (6) the Court itself).
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any secondary audience members automatically benefit from the
opinion.7 1 Second, all Supreme Court opinions - all "cases and
controversies" before the Court - involve real people with real
disputes. Writing an opinion that affects real people in a real dis-
pute should prioritize answering that dispute in a manner that sat-
isfies the participants. Even if the Court views its ultimate role as
something more than pure error-correction, this should remain
the priority. It should remain the first rule of judging. Audiences
beyond the courtroom, while important, should not take prece-
dence over those standing before the Court.
A colleague of mine remarked that while the President has the
power of the sword and Congress the power of the purse, the Su-
preme Court is limited to the power of the pen and verse. The
Court's ability to "say what the law is" becomes both its purpose
and its strength." When the Justices fail to effectively convey the
law, their opinions become increasingly difficult to understand
and enforce. The law becomes difficult to predict and follow.
When the Court does not clearly say what the law is, it has not
effectively performed its role in the democratic process.
The Justices should never lose sight of the ordinary person.80
Simply put, "[aln opinion which has to be read two or three times,
and slowly at that, before a lawyer of average intelligence can get
any definite meaning out of it, is a bad opinion. "81 Under this def-
inition, the Supreme Court writes too many "bad" opinions.
7 Ruggero J. Aldisert, Opinion Writing 22-24 (3d ed. 2012) (dividing the two
audiences between the "primary consumers" and "secondary markets").
7 Bell, Style in Judicial Writing, 1 J. Nat'l Ass'n Admin. L. Judges at 26 ("In the
common-law countries the courts play a fundamental role in applying and
developing the law. This function is served largely by communication through
written opinions.").
s Cf Waye, Who Are Judges Writing for?, 34 U.W. Austl. L. Rev. at 281 (making
a similar accessibility argument regarding the Australian court system).
si William M. Blatt, An Opinion on Opinions, 12 Law Soc'yJ. 292, 292 (1946).
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For all the convenience it offers, modern technology may
contribute to the prolixity problem by minimizing the physical
challenge of getting words on the page. No longer are opinions
drafted by hand or dictated to an assistant.8 2 Most judicial law
clerks have never used a typewriter, relied on carbon copies, or
required corrective tape. Instead, most judges (and law clerks)
draft their opinions on a computer with word-processing soft-
ware that permits, perhaps even encourages, wordiness. If they
struggle for a word, they can simply pull down the thesaurus and
find a suitable term. But physical ease in composition is no sub-
stitute for the intellectual rigor of clear, concise writing.
Many have speculated that the tightness of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes's opinions was due to his drafting in longhand
while standing up." Few, if any, judges still approach opinion
drafting this way. But it is hard to accept that Holmes's clear writ-
ing - universally lauded as excellent - was due merely to draft-
ing while upright. More was necessary. More was certainly done.
Clear thinking leads to clear writing. Clear writing aids in clear
understanding. Holmes wrote clearly.
Recent resistance to Obergefell and its constitutionalizing a
right to same-sex marriage may be attributable, at least in part, to
the unwieldy opinions, including scathing dissents intended to
undermine the majority opinion. The dense opinions lack clarity
and direction. The legal reasoning seems opaque, if not indecisive.
Despite five separate opinions, few among us can easily articulate
82 Clarence M. Hanson, Judicial Administration: The Avalanche of Appellate
Court Opinions, 33 A.B.A. J. 426, 427 (1947) (noting in 1947 that the growth in
bulky opinions devoid of adequate analysis was "[n]o doubt... due to the
present-day method of dictating opinions instead of writing them out in long
hand").
Bell, Style inJudicial Writing, 1 J. Nat'l Ass'n Admin. L. Judges at 29 (explaining
that Holmes himself attributed his short opinions to the fact that he "wrote his
opinions in longhand while standing at a desk. [Holmes] felt that standing con-
tributed to brevity. Perhaps there should be a return to his practice.").
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why marriage, a matter historically reserved to the states, is now
a federal matter. After reading Obergefell, one finds it difficult to
say with confidence what the law is.
My complaints about Obergefell are not substantive. Instead,
I challenge the writing that fueled resistance to the opinion. Un-
certainty follows even today. Does the decision embrace
common-law marriage? Is the decision retroactive? With such a
lengthy opinion, one would expect the legal basis for the decision
to be clear, or at least reasonably ascertainable. It is not. In con-
trast to so many of the well-written opinions that lead us to accept
the Court's proclamations, Obergefell falls flat.
Supreme Challenge: Do as We Say
The Supreme Court's rules put a premium on clear, concise
writing. Rule 14 requires litigants to state their claims "briefly and
in plain terms. "84 It also demands a "direct and concise argu-
ment."8 5 A petitioner's "failure . .. to present with accuracy, brev-
ity, and clarity whatever is essential to ready and adequate under-
standing of the points requiring consideration is sufficient reason
for the Court to deny a petition [for certiorari]."86 Thus, if the
Court finds a litigant's writing intolerably verbose, convoluted,
or imprecise, that finding alone is grounds for denying certiorari.
Litigants must also meet mandated word limits, which vary
by document. For example, Supreme Court Rule 33 limits peti-
tions for certiorari to 9,000 words." Estimating 250 words per
page, 9,000 words equates to 36 pages. This is nearly twice the
length of the Constitution itself, nearly twice the average State of
the Union address, and roughly half of Hamlet. If the Justices
84 Sup. Ct. R. 14.
s5 Id.
s6 Id.
" Sup. Ct. R. 33.
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believe that they can discern the most important constitutional
controversies from no more than 9,000 words, we can reasonably
expect the Justices to resolve those controversies in the same
amount of space.
In short, the Court should demand of itself what it demands
of litigants, adhering to any style requirement or word count
found in its rules." If there are valid reasons to constrain litigants'
petitions and briefs despite a case's historical importance, what
could justify exempting the Court from those constraints? Surely
a case does not become more complicated when it arrives for de-
cision than when it was petitioned or briefed. And unlike the lit-
igants, the Justices have the benefit of already-synthesized argu-
ments and citations.
The Justices would do a great service by adopting the follow-
ing guidelines for all but the most extraordinary cases:
1. No majority opinion should exceed 9,000 words, the limit
for petitions for certiorari. An opinion should be only as
long as necessary to achieve accuracy.
2. No secondary opinion, either concurring or dissenting,
should exceed 3,000 words, the limit for rehearing mo-
tions. A secondary opinion should be only as long as nec-
essary to achieve accuracy and point out the legal distinc-
tions with the majority opinion.
3. Opinions should be in plain English. Legalese and uncom-
mon words should be avoided if possible.
" Cf Chemerinsky, The Case Against the Supreme Court at 325. While Dean
Chemerinsky has "long believed that the Court would benefit from word and
page limits, like those imposed on litigants," I have not been able to find his
precise formula. The essence of his proposal, however, is one I share. Id. at 322.
In his recommendation section, Dean Chemerinsky simply notes that "[t]here
should be presumptive word and page limits for Supreme Court opinions." Id.
at 325. I would, and do, go further in giving the precise word-count recommen-
dations set forth in this section.
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4. Obiter dicta, digressions, and commentary unnecessary to
the Court's holding should be avoided.
This proposal's focus is on length and clarity. With any word-
length requirement - whether on an exam, in an appellate brief,
or in a judicial opinion - people can and do adapt. The average
Supreme Court opinion is now roughly 5,000 words," so a 9,000-
word limit would seem generous if not extravagant. Supreme
Court opinions should never be longer than the documents pend-
ing before the Court. Of course, if a case is so complicated that
the Court grants the litigants leave to file longer documents, then
the Court should likewise have license to lengthen its opinion.
But when the litigants are constrained to 9,000 words 0 in a peti-
tion for certiorari (a rather generous opportunity to communicate
any message), the Court should be likewise restrained.
Justice Jackson, arguably the Court's finest writer, regularly
drafted clear, succinct opinions. His majority opinion in the fa-
mous flag-salute case, West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, took fewer than 3,900 words." That decision, issued
during World War II, was quite controversial at the time. Yet Jus-
tice Jackson wrote in terse, ordinary language. He explained that
"[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."92
The decision was - and is - accessible to varied audiences.
My proposal recommends limiting secondary opinions to
3,000 words. Again, I chose this number because it is the same
limit that the Court imposes on motions for rehearing." In
" Liptak, supra note 22.
o Sup. Ct. R. 33.
91 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
92 Id. at 642.
9 Sup. Ct. R. 33.
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essence, a concurring opinion is a "yes, but" opinion. Concurring
opinions agree on the result and are written to express some dis-
approval with the Court's method for achieving its result. By def-
inition, a concurring opinion did not garner a majority of votes.
It is secondary, though often useful. A 3,000-word cap is fitting.
It's true that some historically important decisions were con-
curring opinions. For example, Katz v. United States9 4 provides
much of our current Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence.
Justice Harlan's 639-word concurrence in Katz is exemplary. In
disagreeing with the majority's reasoning but not its conclusion,
Justice Harlan briefly stated his preferred approach and gave us
an enduring test to assess the constitutional reasonableness of
searches. 5 He did not belabor the point. My proposed limit
would still allow for a concurrence almost five times longer.
I likewise recommend limiting dissenting opinions to 3,000
words because the dissenting opinion is the losing viewpoint.
And while today's dissent may become tomorrow's majority, at
present the dissent failed to garner sufficient votes. A dissenting
opinion is most like a motion for rehearing because its reasoning
pleads for reconsideration. There is no reason that the losing po-
sition should take up more space than the majority opinion. A
dissent is a call for change. But the ordinary American needs to
know what the law is - not what some of us wish it were or hope
it becomes. A dissent should state its disagreement with the ma-
jority succinctly, clearly, and cogently. The dissent should not re-
ceive the same platform, much less be the same length, as the gov-
erning decision.
Some of the greatest dissents have exposed the majority's er-
rant logic in far fewer than 3,000 words. A notable example was
Justice Jackson's famed dissent in Korematsu v. United States,
94 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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which was fewer than 1,900 words. 6 In it, Justice Jackson penned
this memorable warning in response to the majority's validation
of a World War II executive order interning Japanese Americans:
But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to
show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather ratio-
nalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanc-
tions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and
of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies
about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any au-
thority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need."
Dissents, often more than majority opinions, lend themselves
to memorable sound bites. Justice Holmes, known as the Great
Dissenter, authored the famous dissent in Lochner v. New York."
It remains one of Holmes's masterpieces." Using only 622 words,
Holmes convinces us of the importance of judicial restraint and
respect for legislative judgments.10 0 He reminds us that "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics," 101 while declaring that "[g]eneral propositions do
not decide concrete cases."1 0 2 His words, while few, are forceful.
They are clear. They are memorable. And unlike so many modern
dissents that alternate between discussing differences in judicial
philosophy and casting invectives toward the majority, a Holmes
dissent meant something. He used words sparingly to ensure that
96 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 246.
9 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9 Id.; see also Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is at 206
(comparing Justice Holmes's dissent in Lochner to the majority opinion and
opining that Holmes's dissent was "the more lucid and succinct of the two").
0 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
0 Id. at 75.
102 Id. at 76.
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his message was not diluted or confused. Holmes proves that a
concise dissent can be achieved even in a contentious case.
Katz likewise proves that even contentious, fractured Su-
preme Court opinions can be brief. With its three concurring
opinions"c' and a lengthy dissent,104 Katz comes in at 6,280 words,
excluding footnotes. Importantly, the majority opinion is a mere
2,038 words. Thus, ordinary Americans can read and digest Katz.
Contrast Katz with Obergefell, a case generating five separate,
lengthy opinions with extensive obiter dicta. Much of Obergefell
is vague and redundant. The opinion is the antithesis of accuracy,
brevity, and clarity. Many readers remain unsure whether the de-
cision created a substantive due-process right or uncovered an
equal-protection violation. The constitutional standard of review
applied is equally uncertain. Obergefell exemplifies the need to
fix the Court's verbosity problem.
Courting Supreme Justice: Closing Argument
My proposal for shorter, clearer Supreme Court opinions will
likely go unheeded despite the Justices' own stated preferences
for shorter, tighter legal writing. All past efforts have failed. But
the fact that change may not occur does not minimize the need to
continue this conversation and urge change. As William Blatt
proclaimed in 1946:
The written decision of an appellate court of law, misnamed
an opinion, is a human product with human weaknesses. It
is the interest and duty of the bar and the public to notice
these weaknesses, to point them out and to guard against
103 389 U.S. at 347-64 (concurring opinions consisting of Justice Douglas's 327-
word concurrence, Justice Harlan's 639-word concurrence, and Justice White's
185-page concurrence, which, when combined, added up to roughly half the
length of the majority opinion).
104 Id. at 364-74 (Black, J., dissenting) (an inexplicably lengthy dissent of 3,091
words - or 50% longer than the majority opinion).
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them. Now and then an individual contributes to this end,
but the effort should be general and constant. Hence this
essay.105
In 1984, Justice Arthur Goldberg took up the cause, urging
the Court to show "self-discipline" and "curtail significantly the
length and proliferation of writing by members of the Court. "106
Change never came. Opinions only got longer. He lamented that
"[i]n addition to majority opinions that are overly lengthy, there
is far too much unnecessary writing in concurring and dissenting
opinions. Many concurrences do not actually present a different
point of view."11 7 Many dissenting opinions, Justice Goldberg ex-
plained, are unnecessary because they "more or less repeat the
same thesis. By agreement among the dissenters, in most cases, a
single dissenting opinion could be filed.""as
I concur with Justice Goldberg.
Professor David Mellinkoff - who waged a long, public bat-
tle against legalese and verbosity - perhaps said it best in a de-
ceptively simple quip that exemplifies the power of direct lan-
guage: "The most effective way of shortening law language is for
judges and lawyers to stop writing."1o'
1o5 Blatt, An Opinion on Opinions, 12 Law Soc'y J. at 292.
106 Arthur J. Goldberg, Managing the Supreme Court's Workload, 11 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 353, 355 (1984).
17 Id. at 356.
10s Id.
10' David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law 404 (1963).
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